Using a heterogenous-agent growth model with in-house R&D and incomplete capital markets, we examine the e¢ ciency and distributional e¤ects of alternative public R&D policies that target high-tech and low-tech sectors. We …nd that such policies have important implication for e¢ ciency, inequality and social mobility. A regressive public R&D investment …nanced by income tax could boost growth and welfare via a positive e¤ect on individual savings and e¤ort. However, it could also discourage them via its e¤ect on the e¢ ciency-inequality trade o¤. The relationship between public R&D spending and welfare is therefore hump shaped admitting an optimal degree of regressivity in public R&D spending. A case for optimal progressive public R&D investment, however, can be made with a properly designed R&D policy that combines consumption tax and investment subsidy policies.
Introduction
The role of public and private research and development (R&D) investment in economic growth is a widely debated topic.
1 However, the distributional e¤ect of public R&D investment has received little attention. In the extant literature, the focus is more on public education (e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992 , Benabou, 2002 and infrastructure and taxes (e.g., Garcia and Turnovsky, 2007 , Getachew, 2010 , Chatterjee and Turnovsky, 2012 , Getachew and Turnovsky, 2015 . However, one can …nd ample evidence and intuition that public R&D policy could have uneven impacts on the economy. In many developing countries, innovation policy that focuses on the generation of drought resistant varieties and improved intercropping techniques might bene…t marginal farmers more than proportional. On the contrary, R&D policy that focuses on the development of high yielding variety, fertilizers, large machinery and chemicals may tend to favour large commercialized farmers. In general, most public R&D investment in developed countries are concentrated on high-tech industries such as information technology, biotechnology, communication, and environment industries. In the United States, for instance, public investment in equipment and software has increased from 20% in 1980 to 50% in 2001 (Cozzi and Impullitti, 2010) . 2 In contrast, in most of the developing world, a significant amount of public R&D investment are made in agriculture, a low-tech sector dominated by small scale farmers that constitute the majority of the population. Beintema et al. (2012) report that there is an accelerated public investment in agricultural R&D in developing countries during the period 2000 and 2008. The ratio of agricultural R&D spending to the global public spending increased from 39% to 46% in the developing world that includes middle and low income countries. The aim of 1 Particularly, in early 90s, there was an in ‡ux of R&D based growth theories, following the seminal works by Romer (1990) , Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) that emphasize the role of R&D to economic growth, through in ‡uencing technological progress. R&D policies are also widely debated in terms of whether public R&D investment complements private R&D investment or crowds it out (e.g., David et al., 2000) .
2 Kim et al. (2013) argue that R&D investment in South Korea is concentrated more on high-tech sectors.
this paper is to examine the e¢ ciency, inequality and social mobility e¤ects of such redistributive innovation policies.
A growing number of empirical studies try to assess the impact of di¤erent R&D policies on income inequality. Using provincial data in China for more than four decades, Zhang and Fan (2004) argue that government spending on agricultural R&D contributes to a reduction in regional inequality. Cozzi and Impullitti (2010) argue that government policy in R&D procurement plays a signi…cant role in explaining the rising inequality in recent decades in the U.S.. They argue that an increase in public R&D investment in high-tech sectors of the economy in the early 1980s substantially boosted the relative wage of skilled workers. Our own calculations also suggest a contrasting relationship between inequality and public R&D spending, which is consistent with the previous studies. Figures 1 and 2 feature relationships between GINI index and the share of the public R&D spending in the U.S. and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), respectively.
3 In both regions, public R&D spending has sharply increased during these periods, but the trend in inequality is quite opposite.
4
While there is a positive correlation between these two variables for the U.S., the scatter plot for the SSA implies a negative correlation.
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3 The data come from World Bank (2015) . Time average of GINI index and the share of public R&D are computed. Twenty two SSA countries, for which both inequality and R&D data are available are included. Inequality measure for each country is the time average of GINI from 1990 onward. Time series data for GINI are rather sparse for each country. 4 The average annual agricultural R&D spending growth in SSA countries, for instance, increased from 0.3% during [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] to 2.8% during 2000-2008 except for a small dip of .01% during 1990-2000, which is indicative of the bulk of recent R&D innovations in SSA being progressive in nature (Beintema et al., 2012) . 5 The correlation coe¢ cients between GINI and R&D spending ratio are 0.81 and -0.25, signi…cant at 5% level for the U.S. and SSA, respectively. Dropping South Africa as an outlier (which has the highest GINI coe¢ cient of 0.62) raises the correlation coe¢ cient to -0.41, which is also signi…cant at 5% level. For the U.S., the high correlation could be due to a common trend as both variables show a secular increase. Taking out the trend using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) …lter changes the correlation to 0.35. This paper develops a heterogenous-agent growth model with in-house R&D where both inequality and growth are endogenously determined. In the model, agents are heterogenous in terms of their initial endowments of knowledge and their ability to generate knowledge. The source of endogenous growth (technological progress) is in-house R&D investment using private and public resources. Endogenous inequality is generated due to missing credit and insurance markets, as in Loury (1981) and Benabou (2000 Benabou ( , 2002 Benabou ( , 2005 . The dynamics of aggregate variables and inequality are jointly determined in the model that admits a closed-form analytical solution.
Using this framework, we analyze the e¤ects of progressive and regressive public R&D investment policies on inequality, social mobility, growth and welfare. For each policy, we ask what degree of regressivity/progressivity is e¢ cient, or growthand welfare-maximizing. We …nd that regressive (progressive) R&D investment policy essentially aggravates (mitigates) inequality and slows down (speeds up) social mobility. However, the relationship between e¢ ciency and redistributive innovation policy is nonlinear. Regressive innovation policies have the bene…t of promoting e¢ ciency, due to incentives on agents'savings and e¤ort decisions. Progressive policies also have bene…ts, due to imperfections in capital markets; redistributive R&D policy then provides a means to relax the credit constraints that impede certain investments. When calibrating the model for reasonable parameter values, the relationship between public R&D spending and welfare is hump shaped and admits an optimal degree of regressivity in public R&D spending. However, a novel case for optimal progressive R&D policy can be provided through a properly designed tax-subsidy policy. In particular, a consumption tax and investment subsidy can be designed to correct some of the negative e¤ects on private investment and restore it to a regime with neutral R&D policy.
The paper connects to a wider literature in inequality, social mobility and growth. It relates to the literature that analyzes the growth-inequality trade o¤ under imperfect credit markets (see, for e.g., Loury, 1981 , Galor and Zeira, 1993 , Aghion and Bolton, 1997 , Aghion, et al., 1999 , Benabou, 2000 and Basu and Getachew, 2015 . 6 Our focus on redistributive productive public goods also connects us to the literature in public education and inequality, 7 and, infrastructure and inequality, 8 despite the scant attention they pay to public R&D investment. The 6 This literature mainly abstracts from productive public spending issues, however. For instance, Benabou (2005) focuses on the distributional and growth impact of progressive taxation.
7 See, for example, Ravikumar (1992, 2003) , Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) and Eckstein and Zilcha (1994) among many other.
8 See, for e.g., Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2007) , Getachew (2010 Getachew ( , 2012 , Chatterjee and paper mainly complements, but di¤er, to the growing literature on innovation and inequality (e.g., Chu, 2010 , Cozzi and Impullitti, 2010 , and Aghion et al., 2015 . This literature focuses on the e¤ects of innovation or innovation policy on inequality and social mobility. 9 We provide a novel mechanism related to the optimality of alternative redistributive innovation policies.
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The paper is organized as follows: The next Section develops the model. Section 3 characterizes individual and aggregate (inequality) dynamics. Section 4 discusses the e¤ects of di¤erent R&D policies on steady-state growth and inequality while Section 5 focuses on optimality of alternative R&D policies. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
We assume that the economy is populated with a continuum of heterogenous agents, i 2 (0; 1). There is no population growth in the economy. The …rst generation of the ith agent is endowed with h i0 levels of knowledge. Initial distribution is given and assumed to take log-normal, ln h i0 N ( 0 ; 2 0 ), which evolves endogenously at equilibrium. Agents also di¤er in their respective productivity and creativity to generate income and knowledge, respectively, where both are assumed to be i.i.d. and log-normally distributed. Combined with labour, knowledge is used to produce intermediate goods, which are, in turn, used for production of the …nal goods.
There are three sectors in the economy, namely the …nal goods, the intermediate goods and the knowledge production sectors. Using a CES production function, a competitive …rm transforms intermediate inputs into a …nal good. These di¤erenti-ated intermediate inputs are produced by competitive …rms using a convex technology. Each …rm in this sector invests in an in-house R&D, in the spirit of Smulders Turnovsky (2012) , and Getachew and Turnovsky (2015) . 9 Chu (2010), for instance, argues that strengthening patent policy increases income inequality by raising the return on assets. Whereas, Aghion et al. (2015) focus on the relationship between innovation, top income inequality and social mobility for the U.S..
10 Our paper may also relate to the strand of literature that attributes the recent rise in inequality in many advanced economies to skill biased technical change (see, for instance, Acemoglu, 2002 and Aghion, 2002) although this literature often focuses on private R&D investment or technical progress and abstracts from optimal public R&D policy.
and Van de Klundert (1995) , to expand a specialized know-how that is required to produce a specialized input. The production of knowledge requires both the use of public and private resources, and a backlog of knowledge stock. The government levies a …xed ‡at rate tax on the income of individual agents to …nance the 'public good'. This public good is provided disproportionately among rich and poor agents to supplement private R&D investment.
Final goods
In the spirit of Benabou (1996) , the …nal goods and services are produced using a continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate inputs (x it ) by the representative …rm in the economy:
; " > 1
( 1) where x it is the intermediate input supplied by the ith intermediate goods …rm and a 1 is a deterministic TFP parameter; it represents idiosyncratic productivity shocks, which are i.i.d. with mean one and a constant non-zero variance, attached to each intermediate input:
" > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the intermediate inputs, which determines the …rms'monopoly power, in the spirit of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . Pro…t maximization by the perfectly competitive …rm, given a unit price of the …nal goods, leads to the downward slopping input demand function:
where p it denotes the price of the ith intermediate good and " is the price elasticity of demand.
Intermediate goods
The di¤erentiated intermediate goods …rms are characterized with certain features. First is the presence of specialization. Knowledge is …rm-speci…c, and hence the production of intermediate goods. Thus, each intermediate goods …rm has some monopoly power over its price. Consequently, the rate of returns and earnings are different among …rms in this sector. Second, a …rm in this sector engages in an in-house R&D investment to expand its specialized knowledge stock. The R&D investment is the only vehicle of technical progress.
As in Aghion et al. (2015) , the ith …rm in the intermediate goods sector needs 1=h it units of labour to produce one unit of its variety:
where h it represents the stock of the …rm speci…c knowledge, generated through inhouse R&D activity, which is speci…ed below; and, l it is the raw labour input. Each period, the …rm's pro…t consists of revenue from the sale of the intermediate good,
x it , net of the total labor cost (l it w it ) where w it is the wage rate per unit of labor. Thus, the …rm has the following static optimization problem,
subject to the demand function (2). The …rst order condition leads to the following pricing:
While w it =h it is the marginal cost of producing a unit of the intermediate input, the elasticity of substitution, ", determines the mark-up over this cost. The ith agent income is given by y it = l it w it . Substituting (2), (3) and (4) into this, one obtains:
where a 1 a 1 and (" 1) =". Eq. (5) matches individual income to output production, characterized by constant returns to scale at individual (h it ) and aggregate accumulative factors (h t ) in total.
11 However, there is diminishing returns to individual factor. This shows that the model is basically in the spirit of the Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986) learningby-doing endogenous growth models.
In-house R&D
Each intermediate goods …rm invests in an in-house R&D to produce the knowhow using the following knowledge production function:
Government intervenes in the R&D process by investing in public R&D input (g it ) that uses to complement the private sector, but with a redistributive intent. According to (6), knowledge is a product of both public and private investment (g it and s it , respectively), past knowledge stock of the …rm (h it ) and idiosyncratic shocks ( it+1 ). f ; ; g 2 (0; 1) denote knowledge elasticities. it+1 is i.i.d. and follows a log-normal distribution with mean one and a constant variance,
The production function (6) exhibits constant-returns to scale ( + + = 1), which makes the growth process endogenous as in any standard growth model.
Government budget
Public R&D investment is …nanced using a proportional income tax ( ), which is levied in the …nal goods. The government balances the budget as in the growth and public investment literature (e.g., Barro, 1990) :
where g t denotes the total public investment in R&D and is the public expenditure GDP ratio. Thus, a fraction of aggregate income is used to …nance the public good.
11 As we see later, y t is a linear function of h t and l it = l, which is constant.
The key feature of this paper lies in the relationship between the production of knowledge and public expenditure. We abstract from a blanket public investment provision in R&D. Rather the government expenditure in R&D has a redistributive component. Public R&D investment does not necessarily bene…t individual …rms proportionally. Small …rms may bene…t disproportionately from low-tech technologies as large …rms do from high-tech technologies. For instance, an innovation of a pedal-powered tractor is more bene…cial to small-scale farmers, as a high-powered tractors for large commercial farms. Formally, this can be expressed as
The key redistributive R&D policy parameter is !. Its magnitude and sign determine the weight and nature of redistribution, respectively. If ! = 0, for instance, g it = g t is a pure public good where all …rms equiproportionately bene…t from public R&D. We call such a R&D policy neutral because it is not biased towards the rich or poor. A positive ! implies merit-based public expenditure. R&D …rms with a relatively high level of initial knowledge stock compared to the average knowledge stock (meaning a higher h it =h t ) bene…t more than proportional from public R&D spending (g t ). A negative !, on the other hand, makes small …rms with a relatively lower level of initial knowledge stock (a lower h it =h t ) bene…t more from public spending on R&D. Hereafter, we refer to negative ! and positive ! as progressive and regressive public expenditure, respectively, in line to the literature in progressive/regressive taxation.
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Combining (6) and (8) one obtains:
12 In Benabou (2000 Benabou ( , 2002 , for instance, after-tax income is given by b y it = (y it =e y t ) e y t where y it and e y t represent before-tax and threshold incomes, respectively; , which has basically a similar role as ! has in our model, represents the marginal tax rate whose sign determines the progressivity/regressivity of the tax schedule. We di¤er from this literature, however, as we focus on the expenditure side.
The parameters and are ex ante knowledge elasticities whereas + ! and ! capture ex post intergenerational linkages associated with …rm level knowledge production that account for individual and aggregate factors in the economy, respectively. 13 The term ! captures the redistributive nature of the public variable and its implication for individual knowledge accumulation. Redistribution thus impacts the economy via the e¤ect on private and public knowledge elasticities. We see later individual optimal decision is crucially dependent on + ! , which is also the main determinant of the evolution of inequality, which, in turn, determines other macroeconomic dynamics.
Household
There is a continuum of households indexed between (0; 1). Households own the …rms.
14 Similar to Benabou (2002 Benabou ( , 2005 , the credit and insurance markets are missing. We also assume members of the households are endowed with units of labour that they supply elastically. Agents maximize their utility in accordance of the following function:
where > 1; E t is an individual's expectation given information at date t. The budget constraint is given by:
where represents income tax. Applying standard methods, individual household decision rules can be derived as follows:
where
Eqs. (12) are standard forms from the view point of household optimization. Households supply a constant unit of labour while saving rate is independent of rate of returns, as a consequence of log utility function. Both saving rate and e¤ort increase with the discount factor ( ), elasticity of substitution ("), intergenerational spillover ( ), and the elasticity of private investment ( ). But, the e¤ect of ! and on saving rate and labor supply depend on the sign of !. Both increase if the R&D program is regressive (! > 0) while they decrease if it is progressive (! < 0), the classic e¢ ciency-equity trade o¤. We thus have the following proposition: Proposition 1. Saving rate and labour supply increase (decrease) with regressive (progressive) public R&D investment.
Proof. See eqs. (12a) and (12b).
Aggregate consumption, investment and income:
Aggregate consumption and savings are given by
Aggregate income is derived from aggregating (5), after substituting (12b):
where d t is a composite parameter, which captures the relationship between aggregate income and inequality:
In this case, the government budget constraint is given by, from (7) and (15):
where l is given by (12b). Given that individuals' income is determined by their optimal labor supply, aggregate labor is an important component of aggregate income and hence aggregate public R&D expenditure. In addition, considering d t < 0, the existence of diminishing returns in individual income combined with missing credit markets implies that aggregate income, and hence public R&D decrease in inequality.
Dynamics

Optimal knowledge dynamics and intergenerational mobility
The dynamics of optimal knowledge stock associated to the ith …rm is derived from (5), (9) (12a), (12b), (15) and (16):
where a 3 ( = ) ( + )= a ( + )= and
Eq. (17) captures the optimal dynamics of knowledge at a …rm level. and ! are policy parameters while the rest are structural parameters. The government adjusts the size of investment through its choice of whereas the sign of ! determines the redistributive nature of the public fund. Such policy variables impact the TFP of individual knowledge production function via their e¤ects on individual savings, e¤ort and public R&D investment. These are in particular re ‡ected in and . As captured in , there is a positive e¤ect from income tax through its …nancing of public R&D expenditure; but, a negative e¤ect in its distortionary e¤ects on individual savings. The resultant e¤ect is determined by the weight of the respective elasticities. From , redistribution (!) a¤ects individual knowledge production through its e¤ects on individual saving rate and e¤ort. Redistributions also impact the elasticities of past knowledge ( , ) with an important implication to inequality dynamics. The dynamics of optimal individual knowledge also depends on the current individual and aggregate knowledge variables, idiosyncratic risks both in the …nal goods ( it ) and R&D sectors ( it+1 ) and current inequality. Risks in the …nal goods sectors a¤ect individual savings and investment indirectly via individual income whereas those in the knowledge sector have a direct impact. The exponential term in (17) captures the relationship between inequality and individual knowledge dynamics. d t < 0 re ‡ects the negative e¤ects of inequality on knowledge production at …rm level. Through its impacts on aggregate and subsequent individual savings and investment, inequality negatively impacts individual knowledge accumulation.
Intergenerational mobility
The model has a direct implication for intergenerational mobility, as in Basu and Getachew (2015) . The intergenerational elasticity (IGE) of knowledge ( ) is derived from (17), …rst by taking logs from both sides of the equation, and then computing the partial derivative of the next-period knowledge with respect to the current knowledge:
1 is a measure of intergenerational mobility. We are measuring mobility in terms of knowledge while in majority of the literature it is measured in terms of income (see, for instance, Solon, 1992 and Mazumder, 2005, among others) . Given that knowledge is the only input in the production function, it is straightforward to verify from (12a) that also governs the intergenerational persistence of income.
According to (19), intergenerational mobility is independent of the idiosyncratic shocks, but it depends crucially on the structure of goods and knowledge production and knowledge accumulation technologies at the individual household level.
Proposition 2. Intergenerational mobility increases in progressive public R&D expenditure (! < 0), and conversely.
Proof. See (19).
Inequality dynamics
The dynamics of inequality is also derived from (17), by taking the log and variance,
Given 2 (0; 1), (20) is a stable dynamics that converges to a steady state inequality. The variance of the idiosyncratic shocks ({ 2 and % 2 ) will determine the long-run property of the model. Volatility in the …nal goods sector a¤ects inequality via its e¤ect on individual savings while volatility in the R&D sector directly impacts inequality dynamics. The root of the dynamics of inequality is determined by , which, in turn, is a function of policy and structural parameters, ", , !, and . Higher intergenerational linkage (higher ) results in higher transitional inequality. Better private investment technology (higher ) implies slower convergence in inequality. Private R&D investment elasticity ( ) also impacts inequality through individual response to luck, with a strong implication to long-run inequality.
The e¤ect of the public variables on the dynamics of inequality rather depends on its redistributive feature (the sign of !). If ! < 0, higher elasticity of public R&D investment (higher ) leads to faster convergence of inequality, and conversely. If ! = 0, i.e. public investment in R&D is proportionally provided, however, the elasticity has a neutral e¤ect in inequality. We thus have the following proposition: Note also that slower mobility (higher ) also implies slow convergence of the inequality dynamics. That is, the greater is, the more persistent inequality becomes. However, since the coe¢ cient in the inequality dynamics (
2 ) is smaller than the mobility coe¢ cient ( ), intergenerational immobility is much more persistent than inequality.
Steady state
Note that given 2 (0; 1), which is the su¢ cient condition for the stability of the distributional dynamics, (20) converges to a unique inequality equilibrium. But, with constant-returns to scale in knowledge production, inequality is the only source of dynamics in the economy. As inequality converges to its equilibrium level, growth also converges to its steady-state level. In this case, long-run inequality and growth are given by, from (20) and aggregating (17), respectively:
where 15 Appendix A provides a detail on the derivation of the balanced growth path.
is the steady-state growth rate of the economy. The long-run equilibrium of the economy is a balanced growth path, with a constant non-zero level of inequality (see Appendix A).
A number of interesting results could be drawn from (21): Firstly, steady-state inequality increases in IGE and volatility. Secondly, Proposition 3 also holds in the steady state. Thirdly, inequality has a negative impact on long-run growth. This is easily seen as all the terms in the bracket in (21b) are negative. Finally, redistributive policy (sign of !) impacts long-run growth directly, via its e¤ect on agents'savings and e¤ort, and indirectly, via the growth-inequality trade o¤.
Optimal redistributive policies
Growth maximizing policies
Should the government innovation policy be progressive or regressive to maximize growth?
16 For a homogeneous economy (especially, h i0 = h 0 ), the choice of ! is straightforward. In order to maximize growth, public policy should be regressive (! > 0) and take the maximum attainable value . Because, in this case regressivity has only the bene…t of promoting e¢ ciency, due to incentives on agents'savings and e¤ort decisions. For the heterogenous case, however, this may not be necessarily true. The policy e¤ect on growth could be rather nonlinear, as both inequality (
2 ) and could increase in !. On the one hand, a regressive R&D policy encourages growth due to its positive impact on savings and e¤ort; on the other, it has a negative impact on growth via the inequality-growth trade o¤. Proof. See Appendix C.
We can have further insight on the nonlinearity, if we specify parameter values that seem reasonable for real economies. We thus set the subjective discount factor at 0:99, as in numerous macroeconomic studies. Following Benabou (2002), we set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1= ( 1) Using the World Bank (2015) database for the period 2005-2014, the average public and private R&D spending GDP ratio is computed as 2:81% for the U.S.. The public R&D spending ratio ( ) is thus 0:548%. The parameter represents the elasticity of knowledge production with respect to private R&D spending. Following Jones and Williams (2000) , we set = 0:5. The value for the elasticity of public knowledge widely varies among empirical estimates. 17 We use Levy's (1990) estimate for the public investment elasticity of private R&D for nine OECD countries between 1963 and 1984, which is about 0:34 and consistent to the estimate's of Leyden and Link (1991) . 18 This implies = 0:16. Finally, we calibrate a 1 to reproduce a 2% average annual growth rates of GDP.
Applying these values to (21b), we …nd that the growth maximizing policy is quite regressive (see Fig. 4 ). Growth is in particular maximized when ! is slightly greater than unity, ! = 1:09. 
Welfare maximizing policies
While growth and inequality are important macroeconomic variables, the economic signi…cance of any policy should be basically judged in terms of its impacts on social welfare. Given that V i0 = max U i0 is the discounted sum of individual welfare, its aggregation across the entire population leads to the discounted sum of aggregate welfare:
Then, the steady-state aggregate welfare is given by (see Appendix B for details)
where c 0 and 2 c are initial aggregate consumption and consumption inequality, respectively.
The …rst term in (23) captures the discounted initial aggregate welfare (at t = 0). Given that h 0 is predetermined, so is 2 0 , which has a negative impact on welfare. Since individuals derive a negative utility from increased e¤ort, the policy e¤ects (!) on the initial welfare is nonlinear. While a higher ! may negatively a¤ect initial welfare via an e¤ect on e¤orts and inequality, it may increase it through boosting initial income (higher y 0 ).
The second term in (23) comes from the economy-wide growth rate, which captures individuals'rewards for saving and investing in their future. In this case, any e¤ect policy has on growth would directly pass to welfare. A higher ! unambiguously raises the steady state inequality, 2 as seen from (21a) and through this channel it lowers growth and hence welfare. On the other hand, it promotes investment and raises e¤ort that could in turn raise growth and thus welfare. Should the government R&D policy be progressive or regressive to maximize welfare? For reasonable parameter values, we see that welfare maximizing policy is also regressive due to a strong growth e¤ects on aggregate welfare (see Fig. 5 ). Aggregate welfare is in particular maximized when ! = 1:07, which is slightly less regressive than the case for growth due to an additional adverse e¤ect of a regressive policy on initial welfare. As seen in Proposition 1, a negative ! depresses individual savings and e¤ort. Thus, it adversely a¤ects growth via its negative e¤ects on private investment and labour supply although it has a positive e¤ect on inequality and hence growth. However, a consumption tax and investment subsidy can be designed to correct some of these negative e¤ects on private investment and restore it to a regime with neutral R&D policy. 20 Let the government subsidizes individual savings (at a rate of #) using a consumption tax. In this case, (6) becomes:
where # is the subsidy rate. Therefore, the individual receives an additional amount of #s it subsidy for s it level of investment. If the government chooses to …nance this with a consumption tax at a rate of c , then individual and (the balanced) government budget constraints become respectively,
and
The rest of the government budget is given separately by (7). With consumption tax, only individual optimal consumption will be a¤ected.
Since all individuals face the same consumption tax rate ( c ) and investment subsidy rate (#), the optimal individual saving rate and the labour supply remain the same as (12a) and (12b) respectively as in the case of no tax-subsidy. The optimal solution for consumption, however, decreases by a factor of 1= (1 + c ).
21
De…ning individual's e¤ective savings as e s it (1 + #) s it , which includes the subsidy, the government could restore individual investment to the regime of neutral innovation policy (! = 0) by setting the investment subsidy rate to:
where # > 0 for ! < 0. The corresponding consumption tax is then given by:
22 This tax-subsidy scheme of the government has no e¤ect on the households'optimal 21 More detailed derivations are available from the authors upon request. 22 In deriving c , …rst aggregate and then substitute (27) and (12a) into (28) to get
savings and labour supply decisions. 23 The e¤ective saving rate is only elevated to the point where it replicates the neutral innovation scenario. In other words, the government can mitigate (at least part of) the adverse growth e¤ect of a progressive innovation policy by designing a tax-subsidy scheme. Our calibration exercise shows that such practice could actually lead to a possibility of an optimal progressive R&D policy. In particular, as shown in Fig. 6 , growth and welfare are maximized at the lowest bound for policy, ! = 1: 696. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a heterogenous-agent growth model with inhouse R&D where both growth and inequality are endogenously determined. We showed that a regressive R&D policy unambiguously escalates economic inequality, and conversely. However, we found the relationship between e¢ ciency and redistributive innovation policies to be nonlinear. Regressive innovation policies have the bene…t of promoting e¢ ciency, due to incentives on agents' savings and e¤ort decisions. Progressive policies also have bene…ts, due to imperfections in capital markets; redistributive R&D policy then provides a means to relax the credit constraints that impede certain investments. In general, the relationship between public R&D spending and welfare is hump shaped and admits an optimal degree of regressivity in public R&D spending. A case for optimal progressive R&D policy, however, has been made with a properly designed R&D policy that combines consumption tax and investment subsidy policies.
Our model is stylized and designed to contrast the e¤ects of alternative redistributive innovation policies on inequality and e¢ ciency, in an extreme form of market incompleteness that rules out capital markets. A simple extension of our model would be to add imperfect credit markets, by allowing individuals to have some access for credit and be able to borrow a fraction of their income, as in Aiyagari (1994) . While unlikely to change the key results, a physical capital investment decision and a more general utility function can also be introduced to enrich the model further. very grateful to Gerhard Glomm for his comments on an earlier version of the paper. Changhyun Park is acknowledged for able research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies. where c 0 is given by, from (13) and (15),
One applies similar procedures to derive the steady-state discounted expected aggregate welfare with consumption tax and investment subsidy (W 0 ): (ii) If 2 0 6 = 0 and { 2 6 = 0 (or % 2 6 = 0), then from (17), 2 = 2 { 2 = (1 2 ) (or 2 = % 2 = (1 2 )). In this case, both 2 and increase in ! in (21b), leading to an ambiguous e¤ect of ! on growth.
